Part Two: Constructing Reality
The concept of models is of central importance to second-order cybernetics, and to systems theory in general. Models are simplified representations of a system that “necessarily ignore those aspects of the system which are irrelevant to the purposes for which the model is constructed” (Heylighen and Joslyn, 2001). However, because the aspects of the system that are considered irrelevant depend on the model’s purpose, and purpose is subjective, the models themselves, even those depicting the same system, will vary subjectively. In this regard, all models are constructed abstractions of whatever systems an individual experiences, not “discover[ies] of an objective ontological reality” (Heylighen, 1997). This principle is a tenet of an epistemology that “has its roots in Kant’s synthesis of rationalism and empiricism” (Heylighen, 1997) – a philosophy of learning called radical constructivism.
Enter Swiss-born Jean Piaget, who began his research as a biologist, but quickly became more interested in the development and processes of thought. His extensive research resulted in what he called genetic epistemology. One of the basic premises of his theory is that thinking develops consequent to an individual adapting their existing schemas (or biological exploratory skills) to new stimuli until their mental constructs of the environment and the environment itself come into some state of equilibrium (Boeree, 1999). This premise – that learners actively construct knowledge rather than receive it from their environment – is the backbone of all constructivist thinking (Driscoll, 2000). Radical constructivism, a term coined by Ernst von Glasersfeld (1990), adds to this foundation the principle that the knowledge an individual constructs by interpreting their experience needs not represent the “real world” in order to be viable. Indeed, if all models are subjective, then even if one mimicked objective reality in every detail, because we have no objective standard by which to verify it, we would never know or appreciate its value. Viability, then, refers to constructed models that either promote, or are benign to, the stability of the system; in this case, the individual and his/her environment.
According to Lev Vygotsky, the environment that plays the chief-most role in the development of cognition is society, or the social interaction that belonging to a society brings. “Consciousness [is] the end product of socialization” because, he claimed, the “relationships between individuals” give rise to “all higher functions” of thought and deed (Vygotsky, 1978). This philosophy forms the basis of social constructivism. It focuses on the idea that individual learning is a socially mediated endeavor (Salomon and Perkins, 1998). Cultural constructivism extends this perspective to “the wider context of cultural influences” (Dougiamas, 1998), which include the use of symbolic systems and artifacts (e.g. language, custom, hammers, etc.) by members of that culture (cc. Wartofsky, 1973). These comprise tools, which Vygotsky’s colleague Alexander Luria (1928) claimed “not only radically change [man’s] conditions of existence, they even react on him in that they effect a change in him and his psychic condition” (p. 493). In other words, the fabrication and use of tools alter the way humans interact with their environment, and these alterations subsequently alter the way humans perceive their environment and themselves. According to this tradition, the “tool of tools” is language, because of its obvious influence over human interaction and cognition.
Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin, like Vygotsky, believed that speech – the spoken language – has a profound influence on individual psychological development. Bakhtin recognized that “’the real unit of speech communication’” is the utterance (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 71 in Wertsch, 1990, p. 116; emphasis in original), and he “sought to provide an account of the principles that organize utterances and their [historical, institutional, cultural and individual] contexts” (p. 116). Of fundamental importance to this “effort is the notion of voice,” as utterances cannot exist without the voice that produces them (p. 116). Bakhtin proposed that voices “have a ‘will’ or ‘intention,’ as well as an ‘accent’ or ‘timbre,’” which are neither random nor “simply selected or created by the speaking subject acting in isolation …Rather they reflect the intention and accent of other voices” (p. 117). Bakhtin (1981) called this process ventriloquation. In this view, “the word in language is half someone else’s. It becomes ‘one’s own’ only when the speaker populates it with his own intention…Prior to this moment of appropriation, the word…exists in other people’s mouths…serving other people’s intentions” (Bakhtin, 1981, pp. 293-4). ‘Any utterance is a link in the chain of speech communication,’” and “must be regarded primarily as a response to preceding utterances of the given [speech communication] sphere” (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 84 in Wertsch, 1990, p. 118; Bakhtin, 1986, p. 91). In this way, social interaction and cultural representation influence, even control, any model of reality an individual constructs.
Social and cultural constructivism make claims about what is – that is, they specify that individuals learn through social and cultural interaction – without lending consideration to the value of those environments. Critical constructivism “adds a critical dimension aimed at reforming these environments in order to improve the success of constructivism applied as a referent” (Dougiamas, 1998). In other words, this critical perspective assumes the validity of the constructivist perspective, and then focuses on how socio-cultural systems influence its success with individual learners. It is an applied outgrowth of Jürgen Habermas’ critical theory, which identifies “three generic domains of human interest” that are “relevant to what we interpret as knowledge…- work, interaction and power” (emphasis added, MacIsaac, 1996). The work and interaction (or practical) knowledge domains refer to environmental control and interpersonal relationships, respectively, while power (or emancipatory) knowledge focuses on intrapersonal reflection. Power knowledge most directly applies to critical constructivism because it forces the learner to evaluate the validity of the knowledge models they have constructed from work and interaction. The insight of self-reflection provides awareness of the “environmental forces which limit our options” (Habermas in Gortzen and van Gelder, 1970), and informs communication directed at the social and cultural changes required to remove those limits.
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References:
Bakhtin, M. M. 1981. The dialogic imagination (M. Holquist, Ed.). Austin: University of Texas Press.
Bakhtin, M. M. 1986. Speech genres and other late essays (C. Emerson & M. Holquist, Eds.; V.W. McGee, Trans.). Austin: University of Texas Press.Boeree, C. G. 1999. Jean Piaget 1896-1980. Personality Theories. Retrieved February 3, 2005, from http://www.ship.edu/%7Ecgboeree/piaget.html
Dougiamas, M. 1998. A Journey Into Constructivism. Retrieved December 10, 2004. from http://dougiamas.com/writing/constructivism.html
Driscoll, M.P. 2000. Psychology of Learning for Instruction (2nd Ed). USA. Allyn & Bacon.
Gortzen, R. and van Gelder, F. 1970. Jürgen Habermas: The Complete Oeuvre. A Bibliography of Primary Literature, Translations and Reviews. Human Studies 2, 285-300.
Heylighen, F. 1997. “Epistemological Constructivism”, in: F. Heylighen, C. Joslyn and V. Turchin (editors): Principia Cybernetica Web (Principia Cybernetica, Brussels). Retrieved December 10, 2004, from http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/CONSTRUC.html
Heylighen, F. and Joslyn, C. 2001. “Second-Order Cybernetics”, in: F. Heylighen, C. Joslyn and V. Turchin (editors): Principia Cybernetica Web (Principia Cybernetica, Brussels). Retrieved December 10, 2004, from http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/SECORCYB.html
Luria, A.R. 1928. The problem of the cultural development of the child. Journal of Genetic Psychology, 35, 493-506.
MacIsaac, D. 1996. The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas. Retrieved February 6, 2005, from http://physicsed.buffalostate.edu/danowner/habcritthy.htmlSalomon, G. and Perkins, D. 1998. “Individual and Social Aspects of Learning”, in: P. Pearson and A. Iran-Nejad (eds) Review of Research in Education 23 (pp 1-24). American Educational Research Association, Washington DC.
Vygotsky, L. S. 1978. Mind in Society. Cambridge, MA. Harvard University Press.
Von Glasersfeld, E. 1990. “An exposition of constructivism: Why some like it radical”, in R.B. Davis, C.A. Maher and N. Noddings (Eds), Constructivist views on the teaching and learning of mathematics (pp 19-29). Reston, Virginia: National Council of Teachers of Mathematics.
Wartofsky, M. 1973. Models. Dordrecht: D. Reidel
Wertsch, J. V. 1990. The voice of rationality in a sociocultural approach to mind. In Luis C. Moll, ed., Vygotsky and Education: Instructional implications and applications of sociohistorical psychology. New York, N.Y. Cambridge University Press.